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The European Court of Justice and Process-oriented Review 
 
Koen Lenaerts
∗ 
 
Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts 
should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of 
government so as to render it more democratic.
1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts 
should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ 
mechanism.
2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the 
political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the 
authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, 
lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions 
adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to 
enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. 
Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its 
shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.
3 In 
particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of 
the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely 
structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as 
democracy, liberty and equality. 
4  
 
Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the 
leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how 
recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles 
which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their 
decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness 
of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine 
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Union Law, Leuven University. All opinions expressed herein are personal to the author. 
1 See generally S.A. Barber and J.E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 
(Oxford, OUP, 2007) 
2  See  United States v Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), footnote four. See, 
notably, J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980). 
3 L.H. Tribe, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories’ (1980) 89 Yale 
Law Journal 1063. 
4  A. Barber and J.E. Fleming, above n 1, at 121 (who argue that ‘[i]f the cases manifesting 
“structuralism” show anything, they show a history, perhaps a tradition, of disagreement over 
structural questions. They show that judges can’t solve structural questions by pointing to 
structures’).    3 
whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the 
procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that 
judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by 
a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of 
the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU 
policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference 
procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.
5 Whilst 
in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court 
disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the 
latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid. 
 
I.  The importance of the prior assessment of the different policy choices 
available 
 
In Vodafone, four of the leading European mobile operators, Vodafone, Telefónica 
O2, T-Mobile and Orange (the ‘applicants’), challenged the provisions adopted by the 
UK which implemented Regulation No 717/2007
6 (the ‘Roaming Regulation’).
7 That 
Regulation lays down maximum charges that mobile operators may levy for voice 
calls made and received by users outside their own network (this is known as the 
‘Euro-tariff’).
8 The Roaming Regulation also lays down the maximum price that the 
consumer’s operator must pay to the foreign operator when that consumer uses the 
latter operator’s network (this is known as the ‘wholesale roaming charges’). 
Additionally, mobile operators are obliged to provide information about roaming 
charges to customers.
9 
 
The High Court referred two questions on the validity of the Roaming 
Regulation to the ECJ. First, it asked whether ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 
TFEU) was an adequate legal basis to adopt the Roaming Regulation. Second, it 
                                                            
5 See C-58/08 Vodafone and Others, judgment of 8 June 2010, not yet reported; Joined Cases C-
92 and 93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR, judgment of 9 November 2010, not yet 
reported; Case C-236/09  Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, 
judgment of 1 March 2011, not yet reported. 
6 OJ [2007] L 171/32. That Regulation has been amended by Regulation No 544/2009, OJ [2009] L 
167/12, so that now the imposition of maximum wholesale and retail prices also applies for 
SMS and data roaming.  
7 See Article 4 of the Roaming Regulation. 
8 See Article 3 of the Roaming Regulation.  
9 See Article 6 of the Roaming Regulation.   4 
also wished to know whether, by imposing a Euro-tariff, the EU legislator had violated 
the principles of proportionality and/or subsidiarity.  
 
The ECJ began by recalling the conditions that must be met in order for the 
EU legislator to rely on ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU).
10 First, ‘a mere 
finding of disparities between national rules and the abstract risk of infringements of 
fundamental freedoms or distortion of competition is not sufficient to justify the choice 
of [ex] Article 95 EC [now Article 114 TFEU] as a legal basis’. In addition, those 
disparities must ‘obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on 
the functioning of the internal market’.
11 Secondly, ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 
TFEU) may be relied upon prospectively, i.e. so as to ‘to prevent the emergence of 
such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent development of national laws’, 
provided that that emergence is likely to happen and that the EU measure in question 
is designed to prevent it.
12 Thirdly, ‘[w]here an act based on [ex] Article 95 EC [now 
Article 114 TFEU] has already removed any obstacle to trade in the area that it 
harmonises, the [EU] legislature cannot be denied the possibility of adapting that act 
to any change in circumstances or development of knowledge having regard to its 
task of safeguarding the general interests recognised by the Treaty’.
13 Fourthly, the 
ECJ recalled that the EU legislator enjoys discretion in relation to the method of 
approximation most appropriate for achieving the desired result.
14 Last but not least, 
nothing prevents the EU legislator from adopting harmonising measures which seek 
to ensure a high level of consumer protection and a high level of competition, in so 
far as the conditions for having recourse to ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU) 
are fulfilled.
15  
 
  As to the case at hand, the ECJ noted that prior to the adoption of the 
Roaming Regulation the level of charges for international roaming services was high. 
This was due to the high wholesale charges levied by the foreign operators as well 
as to the high retail mark-ups charged by the home operator.
16  The relationship 
between costs and roaming prices, the ECJ observed, was not that of a fully 
                                                            
10 Vodafone and Others, above n 5, paras 32 to 36.  
11  See  e.g. Case C-380/03  Germany v Parliament and Council  [2006] ECR I-11573; Case 
C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paras 84 and 106. 
12 See e.g. Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-593, para. 64. 
13 See e.g. Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] 
ECR I-11453, paras 77 and 78. 
14 See Case C-217/04 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-3771, para. 43. 
15 See e.g. Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I-
6451, para. 30.   5 
competitive market. In addition, the tools with which the National Regulatory 
Authorities (the ‘NRAs’) had been provided by Directive 2002/21
17 were insufficient to 
take effective and decisive action with regard to the high level of wholesale prices for 
roaming services.
18 For example, a French NRA could not control the high wholesale 
roaming charges levied by a mobile operator located in Spain. Moreover, there was 
an increasing pressure for the Member States to solve the high level of retail charges 
for EU-wide roaming services. According to the explanatory memorandum and the 
Impact Assessment Report (the ‘IAR’), such national measures –  based on the 
Member States’ residual competences as regards consumer protection rules – would 
have led to a divergent development of national laws.
19  In order to correct that 
situation, the ECJ held that the EU legislator was entitled to adopt a specific ex ante 
regulatory measure which would take into account the unique characteristics of the 
roaming markets and seek to maintain competition among mobile operators, namely 
the imposition of a price ceiling for the retail and wholesale charges made for 
roaming services. 
 
As to the principle of proportionality, the question was whether, by laying 
down a Euro-tariff, the Roaming Regulation breached that principle. To begin with, 
the ECJ recalled that, when exercising its legislative powers involving political, 
economic, and social choices of great complexity, the Union enjoys broad discretion. 
Only where an EU measure is manifestly inappropriate to the objectives it pursues 
will the ECJ rule that it is contrary to the principle of proportionality.
20 Yet, the ECJ 
pointed out that the exercise of such discretion must be based on objective criteria.
21 
Next, the ECJ proceeded to determine whether the imposition of a Euro-tariff was 
appropriate for the purpose of protecting consumers against high levels of charges. It 
replied in the affirmative. Had the EU legislator limited itself to fixing maximum prices 
for the wholesale market, the retail charges for EU-wide roaming services would not 
have been reduced. The ECJ observed that the imposition of a Euro-tariff aimed to 
ensure ‘a more reasonable reflection of the underlying costs involved in the provision 
of those services than ha[d] been the case’.
  22 Indeed, as the IAR points out, the 
average retail price for a roaming call was five times higher than the actual cost of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16 Vodafone and Others, above n 5, para. 39. 
17 [2002] OJ L 108/33. 
18 Vodafone and Others, above n 5, para. 42. 
19 Ibid., para. 45. 
20 Ibid., para. 52. 
21 Ibid., para. 53. 
22 Ibid., para. 57.   6 
providing the wholesale service.
23 Next, the ECJ examined whether the measure at 
issue was necessary. The applicants argued that the Roaming Regulation should 
have been limited to fixing wholesale charges, whilst leaving to the rules of supply 
and demand the fixing of prices in the retail market. Where there was a market 
failure, the applicants posited, the NRAs could intervene. However, the ECJ 
disagreed. As recital 14  and the IAR state, ‘experience has shown that reductions in 
wholesale prices for [EU]-wide roaming services may not be reflected in lower retail 
prices for roaming owing to the absence of [competitive] incentives for this to 
happen’. The ECJ also stressed that ‘only the regulation of retail charges could 
improve the situation of consumers directly’.
24 Hence, in light of the broad discretion 
enjoyed by the EU legislator, it was legitimate for the latter to set out a scheme 
regulating both the wholesale and the retail markets.
25 Moreover, the measure at 
issue was proportionate in so far as it was limited in time. Article 13 of the Roaming 
Regulation contained a ‘sunset clause’, i.e. that Regulation was to expire on 30 June 
2010.
26 
 
As to the principle of subsidiarity, the ECJ focused on the imposition of a 
Euro-tariff. In contrast to the position on the retail market, it was clear that Member 
States lacked the regulatory competence in the wholesale market, since a Member 
State could not impose a price ceiling on a mobile operator located in another 
Member State. Accordingly, in relation to the wholesale market, the fact that the 
Roaming Regulation  complied with the principle of subsidiarity was self-evident. 
Regarding the Euro-tariff, the ECJ observed that the Roaming Regulation sought to 
contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market, by allowing operators to 
act within a single and coherent regulatory framework. To that end, the EU legislator 
was entitled to adopt harmonising measures which prevented diverging national laws 
from disrupting that framework. Accordingly, given the interdependence between the 
wholesale and retail roaming markets, a regulatory framework limited to one of those 
                                                            
23 Ibid., para. 58. 
24 Ibid., para. 66. 
25 Ibid., para. 68. 
26 Ibid., para. 69. However, see Article 13 as amended by Regulation 544/2009, above n 6, which 
now provides that the Roaming Regulation is to expire on 30 June 2012. Moreover, it is true 
that, in accordance with paragraph 69 of the judgment, the ECJ appears to introduce a three-
pronged proportionality test, whereby, in addition to the ‘suitability’ and ‘necessity’ tests, the 
ECJ also balances the objective pursued by the measure in question against the economic 
burdens imposed on mobile operators. However, see Brenncke, Case Note (2010) 47 Common 
Market Law Review 1793, at 1811, who observes that the ECJ did not apply a substantive test 
of proportionality stricto sensu, but limited itself to ruling that the measures at issue were 
proportionate in light of the importance of the objective pursued and the limited duration of the 
intervention.   7 
two markets would have turned out to be insufficient to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the internal market in roaming services. Hence, a joint regulatory 
intervention in both markets was required and would be best achieved at EU level.
27 
 
Vodafone  is an interesting example that shows how the ECJ applies the 
principle of proportionality in a procedural fashion. Instead of second-guessing the 
merits of the substantive choices made by the EU legislator, the ECJ preferred to 
make sure that lawmakers had done their work properly: the EU legislator had to 
show before the ECJ that it had taken into consideration all the relevant interests at 
stake. In so doing, the ECJ stressed the importance of the preparatory study carried 
out by the Commission, in which the latter institution showed that it had examined 
different regulatory options and assessed their economic, social and environmental 
impact, before deciding to impose a price ceiling in the retail roaming market.
28 In the 
Commission’s own words, the impact assessment is ‘the process of systematic 
analysis of the likely impacts of intervention by public authorities. It is as such an 
integral part of the process of designing policy proposals and making decision-
makers and the public aware of the likely impacts’.
29 Indeed, in its judgment, the ECJ 
referred to the findings set out in the IAR on six occasions
30 and to those laid down in 
the explanatory memorandum on five.
31 As Brenncke notes, it seems that ‘[the] more 
the [ECJ] requires from the Commission in procedural terms, […] the more it will 
alleviate the marginal judicial review of the substantive issues which a “manifestly 
inappropriate” standard entails’.
32  
 
The application of ‘procedural proportionality’ in Vodafone is, in my view, a 
positive development in the case-law of the ECJ on the sensitive issue of the vertical 
allocation of powers. It is worth noting that it is the first time ever that the ECJ has 
expressly relied on the IAR when examining the compatibility of an EU policy 
measure with the principle of proportionality.
33  In order to determine whether the 
challenged act is ultra vires or intra vires, the ECJ should not limit its scrutiny to a 
formal reading of the preamble thereof, but it should undertake a close examination 
                                                            
27 Vodafone and Others, above n 5, paras 76 to 78. 
28 See M. Brenncke, above n 26, at 1809.  
29 Communication from the Commission on impact assessment, COM (2002) 276 final, which has 
been recently redrafted by the Commission’s Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92. 
30 Vodafone and Others, above n 5, paras 45, 55, 58 and 65 (three times). 
31 Ibid., paras 39, 43, 45, 59 and 63.  
32 M. Brenncke, above n 26, at 1809-1810. 
33 A. Alemanno, ‘A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment’ (2011) 17 European Public Law 485, 
at 502.   8 
of the explanatory memorandum and, notably, of the IAR. I concur with Craig in that 
the elaboration of an IAR does not exempt the ECJ from checking whether the 
conditions for having recourse to Article 114 TFEU, as a legal basis, have been met. 
However, he correctly posits that the IAR does provide a helpful framework within 
which to address ‘competence creep’ or ‘competence anxiety’ concerns.
34  In his 
view, ‘if the justificatory reasoning to this effect in the [IAR] is wanting, then the ECJ 
should invalidate the relevant instrument, and thereby signal to the political 
institutions that the precepts in the Treaty are to be taken seriously’.
35  
 
This is precisely what the ECJ had previously done in Spain v Council.
36 In 
that case, Spain challenged the validity of the new Community support system for 
cotton adopted by Regulation No 1782/2003 on the ground that that system would 
produce effects that ran directly counter to the avowed aims of supporting cotton 
production and ensuring that cotton was not driven out by other crops in those 
regions where cotton was important for the agricultural economy. In particular, Spain 
argued that Regulation No 1782/2003 was in breach of the principle of 
proportionality, given that, by fixing the amount of the specific aid for cotton at 35% of 
the total existing aid under the previous scheme, the Commission had not taken into 
account labour costs and thus, the new scheme was unable to guarantee the 
profitability of cotton producers. The ECJ sided with Spain. After acknowledging that 
the EU legislator enjoys broad discretion when adopting acts pertaining to the 
Common Agricultural Policy (the ‘CAP’), the ECJ held that such discretion does not 
exempt the EU institutions which have adopted the act in question from ‘show[ing] 
before the [ECJ] that in adopting the act they actually [took] into consideration all the 
relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to 
regulate’.
37 Accordingly, ‘the institutions must at the very least be able to produce 
and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into 
account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on which the exercise 
of their discretion depended’.
38 Hence, since neither the Council nor the Commission 
had provided sufficient factual input to back-up their decision to fix the amount of the 
specific aid for cotton at 35%, the ECJ had no choice but to annul the contested 
Regulation. 
                                                            
34 P. Craig, ‘The ECJ and ultra vires action: A conceptual analysis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law 
Review 395. 
35 Ibid., at 412. 
36 Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR I-7285. 
37 Ibid., para. 122. 
38 Ibid., para. 123.   9 
Moreover, judicial reliance on the IAR is not always possible. For example, it 
is difficult to take into consideration the IAR where the Council and the European 
Parliament have made amendments to the Commission’s proposal. The fact that the 
Council and the European Parliament departed from the IAR does not mean, 
however, that the contested measure is contrary to the principle of proportionality. 
Otherwise, if the Council and the European Parliament were bound by the IAR, the 
principle of institutional balance would be called into question.
39 Yet, Alemanno notes 
that, in such a case, the Council and the European Parliament are compelled, by 
virtue of the 2003 IIA on Better Lawmaking,
40  to carry out their own IAR on the 
proposed amendments to the Commission’s proposal.
41 In Afton Chemical, the ECJ 
took a more limited approach: it just required those amendments to be based on 
scientific data, but it did not require an IAR.
42 
 
In summary, Vodafone  shows how ex ante  legislative assessment and ex 
post judicial review may contribute to a more rational law-making. Most importantly, 
Vodafone  demonstrates that, by basing its reasoning on the IAR, the ECJ gives 
important incentives to the EU legislator to investigate alternative mechanisms and 
policies seriously.
43  
 
II.  Procedural Proportionality and Fundamental Rights 
 
Volker und Markus Schecke is another interesting case where the ECJ decided to 
carry out a ‘process review’ of the contested EU measure. Just as in Vodafone, the 
ECJ also applied the principle of proportionality in a procedural fashion. However, in 
contrast to Vodafone, the principle of proportionality did not operate as a 
constitutional tool designed to protect the Member States from an EU ‘competence 
creep’. In Volker und Markus Schecke, the principle of proportionality was relied upon 
in order to protect individual liberty against arbitrary encroachments by public 
authorities.  
 
                                                            
39 See, in this regard, the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical, delivered on 6 
May 2010, not yet reported, paras 85 and 86.  
40 See Interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, [2003] OJ C321/1. 
41 A. Alemanno, above n 33, at 503. 
42 Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical, judgment of 8 July 2010, not yet reported, paras 49 to 51, and 
57 to 59. 
43 A. Meuwese and P. Popelier, ‘Legal Implications of Better Regulation: A Special Issue’ (2011) 
17 European Public Law 455, at 463.   10 
Volker und Markus Schecke  was decided after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Consequently, the ECJ had recourse to the Charter not only as an 
aid to interpretation, but as primary EU law.
44 Hence, the principle of proportionality 
was applied as defined by Article 52 of the Charter, which states that ‘[s]ubject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 
 
The facts of that case may be summarised as follows. The referring court 
asked, in essence, whether Council Regulation No 1290/2005
45  and Commission 
Regulation No 259/2008
46 were compatible with Articles 7 (right to respect for his or 
her private and family life, home and communications) and 8 (right to the protection 
of personal data) of the Charter. Article 44a of Council Regulation No 1290/2005, on 
the financing of the common agricultural policy, provided that Member States had to 
ensure annual ex post publication of the beneficiaries of the EAGF and the EAFRD 
and the amounts received per beneficiary under each of these Funds. That 
information had to be the subject of a ‘general publication’. For its part, Commission 
Regulation No 259/2008 set out the content of the publication, adding that ‘the 
municipality where the beneficiary resides or is registered and, where available, the 
postal code or the part thereof identifying the municipality’ also had to be published. 
Article 2 of that regulation prescribed that the information was to be made available 
on a single website per Member State so that it could be consulted by means of a 
search tool.  
 
In relation to the existence of an interference with the rights recognised by 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the ECJ held that the ‘publication on a website of data 
naming those beneficiaries and indicating the precise amounts received by them thus 
constitutes an interference with their private life within the meaning of Article 7 of the 
Charter’.
47 In addition, the ECJ ruled that the publication required by Article 44a of 
                                                            
44 See Article 6 TEU. 
45 [2005] OJ L 209/1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1437/2007 of 26 November 
2007, [2007] OJ L 322/1 (‘Regulation No 1290/2005’). 
46 Commission Regulation (EC) No 259/2008 of 18 March 2008 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Regulation No 1290/2005 as regards the publication of information on the 
beneficiaries of funds deriving from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), [2008] OJ L 76/28 (‘Regulation 
No 259/2008’). 
47 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, above n 5, para. 58.   11 
Regulation No 1290/2005 and Regulation No 259/2008 constitutes the processing of 
personal data falling under Article 8(2) of the Charter.
48  
 
As to the justification of the interference with the rights recognised by Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter, the ECJ ruled that ‘it is common ground that the interference 
arising from the publication on a website of data by name relating to the beneficiaries 
concerned must be regarded as ‘provided for by law’ within the meaning of Article 
52(1) of the Charter. Articles 1(1) and 2 of Regulation No 259/2008 expressly provide 
for such publication’.
49  Stated differently, limitations on the fundamental rights 
recognised by the Charter, which are grounded in a Council Regulation, must be 
considered as ‘provided for by law’. It follows that Article 52(1) of the Charter does 
not require limitations on fundamental rights to be grounded in an EU measure 
whose adoption is conditioned upon the European Parliament’s co-decision.  
 
In that regard, Article 52(1) of the Charter states that any limitation on the 
rights thereof must comply with the principle of proportionality. It is thus for the EU 
institutions and, as the case may be, for the national authorities participating in the 
implementation of EU law, to verify that any limitation on fundamental rights is 
suitable to meet the ‘objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’ and ‘the 
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’; and that it does not go beyond 
what is necessary for achieving the legitimate aim pursued. In Volker und Markus 
Schecke, the ECJ found that the publication on a website of the names of the 
beneficiaries of aid from the EAGF and the EAFRD and of the amounts which they 
receive from those Funds was liable to increase transparency with respect to the use 
of the agricultural aid concerned. The ECJ reasoned that such display of information 
reinforced public control of the use to which that money is put and contributes to the 
best use of public funds.
50 However, regarding the necessity of the publication in 
question, the ECJ held that it went beyond what was necessary for achieving the 
legitimate aims pursued, given that neither the Council nor the Commission had 
‘sought to strike [the right] balance between the European Union’s interest in 
guaranteeing the transparency of its acts and ensuring the best use of public funds, 
on the one hand, and the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, on the other’.
51  Indeed, derogations and limitations in relation to the 
                                                            
48 Ibid, para. 60. 
49 Ibid, para. 66. 
50 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, above n 5, para. 75. 
51 Ibid, para. 80.   12 
protection of personal data must apply only in so far as they are strictly necessary.
52 
Thus, the Council and the Commission should have examined whether the legitimate 
objective pursued by the contested regulations could not be achieved by measures 
which interfere less with the right of the beneficiaries concerned to respect for their 
private life in general and the protection of their personal data in particular.
53 
Accordingly, the ECJ ruled that Article 44a of Regulation No 1290/2005 and 
Regulation No 259/2008 were invalid. 
 
One may draw three important conclusions from Volker und Markus Schecke. 
First, by declaring invalid Article 44a of Regulation No 1290/2005 and Regulation No 
259/2008, the ECJ showed, once again, that it takes the protection of fundamental 
rights seriously. Second, Volker und Markus Schecke also seems to confirm that, in 
the realm of fundamental rights protection, the standard of review applied by the ECJ 
is always the same, and does not vary depending on whether the contested measure 
has been adopted by the EU or by the Member States when they implement EU law. 
Indeed, the requirements for a limitation on a fundamental right to be compatible with 
the Charter, laid down in Article 52 thereof, do not distinguish between the EU or the 
national origin of that limitation. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of our 
discussion, in Volker und Markus Schecke, the ECJ found that, as opposed to the 
measure in question in Vodafone, neither the Council nor the Commission had done 
their preparatory work properly. The contested Regulations were deemed 
incompatible with the principle of proportionality because those two institutions had 
failed to examine whether there were alternatives which, whilst attaining the 
objectives pursued, interfered less with the fundamental rights of the beneficiaries 
concerned. For example, the Council and the Commission should have examined 
whether limiting the publication of data by name relating to the beneficiaries of the 
EAGF and the EAFRD to the periods for which they received aid, or the frequency or 
nature and amount of aid received, was enough. It is true that the ECJ seems to 
suggest that such a limited publication ‘would protect some of the beneficiaries 
concerned from interference with their private lives, [whilst providing] citizens with a 
sufficiently accurate image of the aid granted by the EAGF and the EAFRD to 
achieve the objectives of that legislation’.
54 However, the findings of ECJ are not 
conclusive in this respect. It was left for the Council and the Commission, when 
                                                            
52 Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia [2008] ECR I-9831, para. 56. 
53 Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, above n 5,  para. 78, and paras 81 to 86. 
54 Ibid., para. 83.   13 
adopting a new Regulation, to determine whether such limited publication could 
actually guarantee the objectives they pursue.  
 
III.   The Importance of Consistency 
 
In Vodafone and in Volker und Markus Schecke, the principle of proportionality 
was applied internally. The question whether the purposes invoked by the EU 
legislator were genuine did not arise. For example, in Volker und Markus Schecke, 
no one called into question whether the EU legislator was really seeking to enhance 
transparency with respect to the use of the agricultural aid concerned and to 
reinforce public control of the use of that money. By contrast, in Test-Achats, the ECJ 
was confronted with that very question. A close reading of that case reveals that the 
contested EU provision was declared invalid because there was a contradiction 
between that provision and the objectives pursued by the EU act of which it formed 
part. The contested EU provision did not comply with the external aspects of the 
principle of proportionality, i.e. it was not consistent. 
 
In that case, the referring court asked the ECJ whether Article 5(2) of Directive 
2004/113,
55 was valid in light of the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women. Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/113 implements that principle in relation to 
‘actuarial factors’. It provides that the differences in premiums and benefits arising 
from the use of sex as a factor in the calculation thereof must be abolished by 21 
December 2007 at the latest. By way of derogation, the second paragraph of Article 5 
of Directive 2004/113 stated that it was permitted for the Member States to introduce 
proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums and benefits where the use of sex 
was a determining factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate 
actuarial and statistical data.
56  If a Member State made use of that option, its 
decision had to be reviewed five years after 21 December 2007, account being taken 
of a Commission report. 
 
At the outset, the ECJ noted that Directive 2004/113 expressly refers to Articles 
21 and 23 of the Charter. Accordingly, the validity of Article 5(2) of Directive 
                                                            
55 [2002] OJ L 373/27. Directive 2004/133 implements the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. 
56  This meant, for example, that national law could allow car insurance companies to impose 
higher premiums on men than on women given that, in accordance with statistical data, men 
have a higher risk of being in a car accident than women.    14 
2004/113 had to be determined in light of those two provisions. Next, the ECJ looked 
at the Treaty provisions which define the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women as a social objective to be attained by the European Union, namely the 
second subparagraph of Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 8, 19(1) and 157(1) TFEU. In 
this regard, the ECJ pointed out that ‘[i]n the progressive achievement of that 
equality, it is the EU legislature which […] determines when it will take action, having 
regard to the development of economic and social conditions within the European 
Union’.
57 This meant, for example, that, since the use of actuarial factors related to 
sex was a widespread practice in the Member States, it was permissible for the EU 
legislator to provide for the appropriate transitional period. This was actually the 
rationale underpinning Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/113 which sets 21 December 
2007 as the deadline for the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in relation to actuarial factors. By contrast, the ECJ noted 
that Article 5(2) contained a derogation from that principle which was subject to no 
temporal limitation. ‘[G]iven that Directive 2004/113 is silent as to the length of time 
during which those differences may continue to be applied’, the ECJ observed, 
‘Member States which have made use of the option are permitted to allow insurers to 
apply the unequal treatment without any temporal limitation’.
58  
 
The Council argued in favour of the validity of Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/133, 
by pointing out that, in the context of certain branches of private insurance, the 
respective situations of male and female policyholders may not be regarded as 
comparable, given that, in light of statistical data, the levels of insured risk may be 
different for  men and for women. However, the ECJ took a different view. In 
accordance with its Recitals 18 and 19, Directive 2004/133 favoured the application 
of rules of unisex premiums and benefits.  For the ECJ, ‘Directive 2004/113 is based 
on the premise that […] the respective situations of men and women with regard to 
insurance premiums and benefits contracted by them are comparable’.
59  
 
Accordingly, Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113, ‘which enable[d] the Member 
States in question to maintain without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule 
of unisex premiums and benefits, work[ed] against the achievement of the objective 
of equal treatment between men and women, which is the purpose of Directive 
                                                            
57 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, above n 5, para. 20. 
58 Ibid., para. 26. 
59 Ibid., para. 30.   15 
2004/113, and [was] incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter’.
60 
Consequently, the ECJ decided to consider that provision to be invalid upon the 
expiry of an appropriate transitional period, i.e. 21 December 2012.
61  
 
It follows from the foregoing that, just as when testing the compatibility of a 
national measure with EU law,
62 the ECJ also verifies whether there are internal 
inconsistencies as between secondary EU law and hierarchically superior rules of EU 
law. The ruling of the ECJ suggests that it focuses on the contextual aspects of the 
proportionality principle, i.e. on the consistency of the EU measure in question. In 
other words, the principle of proportionality is not applied in an abstract fashion, ‘but 
as a part of the legal and factual context in which the [contested] measure 
operates’.
63  
 
IV.  Concluding remarks 
 
Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats are three recent judgments 
which were delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. To some 
extent, these judgments reveal that, when examining the validity of EU policy 
measures, the ECJ is not reluctant to follow an approach that focuses on improving 
the decision-making process of the EU institutions, rather than on second-guessing 
their substantive findings.  
 
As Vodafone shows, ‘process review’ is an interesting way of making sure 
that, in areas where the EU legislator enjoys broad discretion, the latter does not 
commit abuses. ‘Process review’ increases judicial scrutiny over the decision-making 
process of the EU institutions. However, it prevents the ECJ from intruding into the 
realm of politics. Moreover, by inviting the political institutions of the EU to enhance 
the rationalization of their decision-making process, the ECJ enforces the structure 
put in place by the authors of the Treaties. Whilst ‘process review’ shows due 
                                                            
60 Ibid., para. 32. 
61 21 December 2012 is the date in which the decision to derogate from the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women laid down in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/133 had to be 
reviewed by the Member State concerned. 
62 See e.g. Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica and Others [2007] ECR 
I-1891; Case C-500/06  Corporación Dermoestética  [2008]ECR I-5785; Case C-169/07 
Hartlauer [2009] ECR I-1721; Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao 
Gómez, judgment of 1 June 2010, not yet reported. 
63  G. Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member State 
Measures Restricting Free Movement’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1021, at 1040.   16 
deference to the expertise and higher institutional capacities of policy makers, it may 
be the only way of judicially enforcing principles that have a clear political nature, 
such as the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Moreover, ‘process review’ should always precede substantive judicial review 
in order to allow the ECJ to make use of its ‘passive virtues’
64  by avoiding 
unnecessary substantive conflicts with the EU political institutions. In my view, the 
ECJ is more respectful of the prerogatives of the political institutions of the EU if it 
rules that, when adopting the contested act, those institutions failed to take into 
consideration all the relevant interests at stake, than if it questions their policy 
choices by reference to its own view of the issues involved. This is precisely what the 
ECJ did in Volker und Markus Schecke.  
 
Last but not least, Test-Achats stresses the importance of consistency. By 
looking at the contextual aspects of the principle of proportionality, not only is the 
ECJ enhancing the legitimacy of the EU legislator when the latter imposes limits on 
fundamental rights, but also its own judicial legitimacy. It shows that the ECJ is ready 
to declare invalid an EU provision which, in addition to derogating from a 
fundamental right, gives rise to contradictions with the EU act of which it forms part.  
 
Unlike the U.S. academic debate over structuralism, the purpose of my contribution 
was not to prove the operability (or inoperability) of the ‘substance vs. process’ divide 
in the context of the EU legal order. Instead, I limited myself to showing the 
advantages of reviewing the different procedural steps taken by the EU political 
institutions when adopting an act of general application. In that regard, it seems to 
me that an increased judicial control of the decision-making process does not imply 
that judges should take a more pro-active stand whereby the latter replace the 
substantive choices made by the EU political institutions with their own. Nor should a 
process-oriented review be equated with judicial surrender. On the contrary, more 
often than not, courts can contribute to aligning political decisions with the structure 
set out in the Treaties if they provide incentives to improve the rationality of the 
decision-making process of policy makers. 
 
 
 
                                                            
64 Term borrowed from A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics, 2
nd Ed (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).   17 
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